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THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:
TOWARDS THE RECOGNITION OF A NEW
LEGALLY RELEVANT RELATIONSHIP IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ellen Hey*

I.

INTRODUCTION.

The judicial or quasi-judicial instruments which individuals and
groups have at their disposal for holding international organizations
accountable for the manner in which these organizations exercise public
policy competences are scant, to say the least. This situation is deplorable
both from the point of view of the principle of government subject to the
rule of law and from the point of view of the attainment of such public
policy objectives as the protection of the environment.' It negates the
well documented role which both individuals and groups play in the
achievement of national public policy objectives through challenging
government actions that are contrary to their rights and interests in
court.2 At the national level, the opportunities for individuals and groups
* LL.M, M.Sc., Ph.d., Senior lecturer in public international law, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, Faculty of Law, The Netherlands. The author wishes to thank Dr. Ton van Haaften and
Dr. Andr6 Nollkaemper for their comments on earlier versions of this article. Research for this essay
was completed in February 1996.
1. The same holds true for other policy areas as, for example, the availability of education
for all and the equal treatment of men and women. The examples referred to in this article, however,
to a large extent are taken from policies for the protection of the environment. This is a reflection
both of the catalytic role that environmental concerns played in the establishment of the World Bank
Inspection Panel as well as of the author's background.
2. See Ted Alan, The Phillipine Children's Case: Recognizing Legal Standingfor Future
Generations,6 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 713 (1994); Gerit Betlem, Environmental Locus Standi
in the Netherlands, 4 REv. EUR. COMMUNrrY INT'L ENVTL. L. 238 (1994); Adriana Fabra Aguilar,

Enforcing the Right to a Healthy Environment in Latin America, 3 REV. EUR. COMMUNrrY INT'L
ENVTL. L. 215 (1994); Edesio Femandes, Defending CollectiveInterests in BrazilianEnvironmental
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to litigate their rights and interests vis a vis public authorities may leave

a lot to be desired. 3 By comparison, however, the opportunities for such
litigation where public competences are exercised by international organizations, are almost non-existent. a

In part, this lack of court access at the international level is
explained by the dominant perspective in international law under which
the relationship between an individual or group and an international

organization is not recognized as a relationship which is directly relevant
in law. The Inspection Panel established by the World Bank5 diverts
from the dominant perspective and does recognize this relationship as
directly relevant in law. This essay assesses the extent to which the
Inspection Panel procedure may contribute to the development of a new
perspective in international law.
II.

THE DoMiNANT PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

That individuals and groups, on the one hand, and international
organizations, on the other hand, have legal personality in international
law no longer requires substantiation.6 In both cases the characteristics

Law: An Assessment of the "Civil PublicAction ", 3 REv. EuR. COMMUNITY INT'L ENVTL. L. 253

(1994); Menno T. Kamminga, The PrecautionaryApproach in InternationalHuman Rights Law:
How It Can Benefit the Environmen in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 171 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); Mark A.

Schofield & David S. Thompson, Access to Justice and the Right to a Healthful Environment in
Canada:Public Participationin EnvironmentalDecision Making, 3 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY INT'L
ENVTL L. 231 (1994); Antonio G.M. La Vifla, The Right to a Sound Environmentin the Phillipines:
The Significance of the Miners Oposa Case, 3 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY INT'L ENVTL. L. 246 (1994).
3. Two states, members of the European Union, whose rules on locus standi have been
criticized for being too restrictive are Germany (see Chris Backes, Germanyin INTEGRATED SYSTEM
FOR CONSERVATION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 77 (Karl van der Zwiep & Chris Backes eds.,
1994)) and the United Kingdom (see Philipe Sands, Access to EnvironmentalJustice in the European
Community: Principles, Practices and Proposals,3 REv. EuR. COMMUNITY INT'L ENVTL L. In
addition to the rules on locus standi in the United Kingdom, the author considers the lack of rules
in European Community law which harmonize the standards on access to justice in the member
states as well as the restrictive rules on locus standiapplicable to individuals and groups seeking
access to the European Courts for purposes of having the Courts review decisions of the Community
institutions.
4. See infra note 7.
5. The term 'World Bank' in this essay refers to both the Intemational Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). For
further information on the World Bank Inspection Panel see section 3 infra.
6. For further discussion see Bengt Broms, Subjects: Entitlement in the InternationalLegal
System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (R. St. J. Macdonald &
Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1986); IAN BRowNLiE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5870 (4th ed. 1990) (subjects of international law); Id. at 553-602 (the protection of individuals and
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of legal personality, of course, often are debated. However, the fact of
the existence of legal personality for persons and international organizations no longer is in doubt.
The dominant perspective in international law, except in a few
specific cases 7, does not regard the relationship between these two types
of legal personalities as directly relevant in law. Instead, it assumes that
their interactions are subsumed in the legal relationship between the
international organization and the state subject to which jurisdiction the
individual or group finds itself. The dominant perspective also assumes
that the interests of the individuals or groups and states, coincide and that
those individual or group interests are thus well represented by that state.
The dominant perspective moreover departs from the notion that the
international organization has no public policy competences independent
of its member states.
The dominant perspective of internatonal law with its assumptions
persists even though it belies emerging practices. The gap between those
assumptions and practice means that the relationship between a state

groups); Id. at 679-707 (international organizations); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 39-55 (1994) (participants in the international legal
system); P.IC Menon, InternationalOrganizationsas Subjects of InternationalLaw, 70 INT'L L.
REV.61 (1992); P.K. Menon, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 70 INT'L L. REV. 295
(1992); Daniels Vignes, The Impact of International Organizations on the Development and
Application of PublicInternationalLaw in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
809 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1986).
7. Examples of specific cases in which the relationship between an individual or group and
an international organization is recognized as directly relevant in international law and in which
judicial means for settling disputes are available are as follows. The relationship between an
employee of an international organization and that organization (for further discussion see 2 C.F.
AMERASINOHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE (2d ed. 1994)). The relationship
between a company engaged in deep seabed mining and the Authority as laid down in Part X of
the (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261) (Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 33 I.L.M. 1309)
(for further discussion see The Sea-BedArea, in 1 A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 577
- 832 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991) and (L.D.M. Nelson, The New Deep Sea-Bed
Mining Regime, 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 189 (1995)). In addition, there is of course the
legal system of the European Community which, although it has its origins in international law, is
increasingly developing towards a federal system in which the relationship between the Community's
institutions and individuals or groups is recognized as directly relevant in law and in which some
instruments for judicial review are available (for further discussion see HENRY G. SCHERMERS &
DENIS WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (5th ed. 1992)).
8. David A. Writh, Legitimacy,Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on
Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE LJ. 2645 (1991); (illustrating that if not for the
initiative of individuals and groups a forestry project in Sri Lanka, which was likely to have significant detrimental effects for the environment as well as the people dependent on that environment,
probably would have been approved by the World Bank without the conduct of an environmental
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and an international organization as defined by international law, no
longer serves to satisfactorily regulate the relationship between an
individual or group and an international organization.
In addition, the extent to which international organizations are
bound by international law itself remains an issue of considerable debate.
There is a lack of clarity about the standards by which the conduct of an
international organization should be judged. For example, there is a long
standing debate over whether the World Bank is bound by international
human rights law (especially civil and political rights).9
International law to some extent, however, does recognize nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the role they may play in
furthering such public policy goals as the protection of the environment.
The wide spread observership status attributed to NGOs at meetings of
international organizations concerned with environmental, and other,
issues illustrates this development."
International law, however, does not reflect the notion that if
international organizations, in fact, exercise public policy competences,
the exercise of those competences should be subject to the controls and
rules of law applicable to the exercise of governmental powers in
national societies. As a result, when an international organization decides
to fund a major development project with possible negative repercussions
for individuals and groups, these individuals and groups, under international law, are not in a position to hold the organization accountable for
the manner in which it exercises its public policy competences. Nor can
the organization as a rule be held accountable before a national court for

impact assessment and the determination of conditions seeking to avoid these detrimental effects);
Daniel D. Bradlow, InternationalOrganizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World

Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 557-571 (1994); (illustrating that the Bank's staff
exercises powers independently of its member states); see also references to international
organizations in supra note 6.
9. For further discussion on this debate see Victoria E. Momerstein, World Bank Power to
ConsiderHuman Right Factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 113 (1978-79); Ibrahim
F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and InternationalFinancialInstitutions,8 AM.UJ. INT'L

L. & POL'y 35 (1992).
10. See, e.g., The Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 23(5), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); see
also The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, Sept.
22, 1992, 8 J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 50 (1993). For further discussion on the role of NGOs see
Patricia Waak, Shaping a SustainablePlanet: The Role ofNongovernmental Organizations,6 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345 (1995) (the role of NGOs concerned with population and
environmental issues); see also Lee Kimball, InstitutionalDevelopments, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L.

125, 135-136 (1994) (discussing issues that have arisen in United Nations organizations as a result
of wide spread demands for participation by NGOs in meetings).
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the manner in which it exercises its competences. n States, by attributing
public policy competences to international organizations, thus arguably
may circumvent the procedures which, at the national level, otherwise
may be available for controlling the exercise of such competences.
The dominant perspective assumes that states control the manner in
which international organizations exercise public policy competences.
The instruments of control at their disposal, however, are of a political
nature. International dispute settlement procedures do not play a
prominent role in the settlement of disputes between an international
organization and a member state." Moreover, a member state of an
international organization, especially if it is the beneficiary of the
decision of the organization, may not be the most appropriate entity for
holding that organization accountable.

III. AN ELEMENT OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE.
With the establishment of the Inspection Panel within the World
Bank, the international situation described under the dominant perspective of international law has changed.
The decision to establish the Inspection Panel was taken by the

Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association
(IDA) in 1993.13 The three member Panel commenced its work in

11. International organizations in the territory of their member states enjoy the privileges and
immunities necessary for the fulfilment of their functions (see, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1);
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2 U.N.T.S.
134. Note that in the case of the IBRD, as other international financial organizations which engage
in extensive commercial activities, it is explicitly provided that they do not enjoy immunity from
proceedings before national courts for such activities. See also PETER H.F. BEKER, THE LEGAL
POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1994); BRGWNLE, supra note 6, at 697-98.
12. An exception is the dispute settlement regime contained in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. This system also applies to disputes which may arise between the Authority
and its member states. See Dupuy and Vignes (eds.), supra note 7 at 777-95. The legal system of
the European Community of course also encompasses procedures for the settlement of disputes
between member states and the institutions of the Community. See SCHERMERS AND WAELBROECK,
supra note 7.
13. The IBRD and the IDA on September 22, 1993 adopted identical resolutions, Res. No. 9310 (1993), 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995) (hereinafter
Resolution). For an analysis of the Inspection Panel see Bradlow, supra note 8;IBRAHIM F.I.
SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994); Daniel D. Bradlow and Sabine SchlemerSchulte, "The World Bank's Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the
International Legal Order', 54 ZEITSCHRiFT FGR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
V6LKERRECHT 392 (1994).
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September 1994.14 The Inspection Panel procedure applies to projects
in which the IBRD or the IDA participates. There is some uncertainty as
to whether the procedure applies to the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF). 5 This is because
the Resolution establishing the Panel remains
6
silent on this matter.'
Requests for inspection may be submitted by a group of two or
more people who believe that as a result of a violation by the Bank 7
of its operational policies and procedures," their rights or interests have
been, or are likely to be, adversely affected in a direct and material
way.'9 Such a group may be an organization, association, society or
other grouping of individuals. Such groups of individuals may appoint
a local representative or, in exceptional cases, a foreign representative. °
Before considering a request for inspection, the Panel has to find that the
subject matter of the request previously has been brought to the attention
of the Bank's Management and that the Bank's Management has failed
to take appropriate follow-up steps.2 '

14. On August 19, 1994 the Inspection Panel adopted its Operating Procedures. Inspection
Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
15. The GEF was set up in 1990 to fund environmental projects. Its role was expanded at the
1992 RIO Conference (JNCED). 33 I.L.M. 1273 (1994).
16. The issue of whether or not the GEF is covered by the Resolution is especially important
as this would mean that projects in which the United Nations Development Programme, the United
Nations Environment Programme as well as other international organizations participate and which
are financed though the GEF would also be covered by the Inspection Panel procedure. The Senior
Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, as reported by Ragazzi,
has proposed a positive answer to this question Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection
Panel,(1994), referred to in introductory note by Maurizio Ragazzi, 34 I.L.M. 503 (1995).
17. "A violation by the Bank" includes "situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed
in its follow-up on the borrower's obligations under loan agreements with respect to such policies
and procedures" Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 12, I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), para.
12, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995).
18. The term 'operational policies and procedures' refers to "the Bank's Operational Policies,
Bank Procedures and Operational Directives and similar documents issued before the series was
started, and does not include Guidelines and Best Practices and similar documents and statements."
Id. The Bank's operational policies and procedures relate to, among others, environmental impact
assessment, involuntary resettlement, participation of non-governmental actors in projects, and
indigenous peoples. Id.
19. Id.; Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 1, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
In his memorandum to the Executive Directors the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
the World Bank states that the criteria for standing "clearly exclude complaints by a person or group
on behalf of the public at large (actio populars)", 34 I.L.M. 528 (1995).
20. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 12, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), para. 12,
34 I.L.M. 520 (1995). Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 4, 34 1.L.M. 510
(1995).
21. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 13, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), para. 13,
34 I.L.M. 520 (1995). Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 1, 34 I.L.M. 510
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The inspection procedure consists of two stages. The first stage is
what might be called the establishment of jurisdiction and admissibility.' At the end of this stage the Panel submits its recommendation,
together with the response of the Bank's Management, to the Executive
Directors. The recommendation should advise the Bank whether an
investigation should be conducted. If the Executive Directors decide that
an investigation should be conducted, the second, investigatory, stage
commences. 23 At the end of this stage the Panel submits a report to the
Executive Directors. This report is to include findings as to whether, in
the judgement of the Panel, the Bank has complied with its own policies
and procedures. The Panel's report and the response to the report by the
Bank's Management (which is to include recommendations in response
to the Panel's findings) form the basis for the Executive Directors'
decision on how to proceed with the project.
As of February 1996, four requests for investigations had been
dealt with by the Panel. One request was declared inadmissible and thus
not registered.2 4 Of the three registered requests one was not investigated upon the recommendation of the Panel, 5 one had the investigation
suspended 26 upon the recommendation of the Panel, and one request for
investigation was not pursued by the Executive Directors of the World

(1995).
22. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 16-20,34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), para. 1620, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995). Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, chs. III-IV, 34
I.L.M. 510 (1995). Memorandum of the Senior Vice President and General Council of the World
Bank on the Inspection Panel (Jan. 3, 1995) 34 I.L.M. 525-34 (1995).
23. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 20-25,34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Res. IDA 93-6 (1993), para. 2025, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995). Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, chs. VII-X, 34
I.L.M. 510 (1995).
24. The project concerned the financing of Hydroelectric Dams in the Bibbio River in Chile
by the Inrtemational Finance Corporation (IFC). Alleged Policy ioilations by the International
Finance Corporation in the Financingof the Hydroelectric Dams in the Bibbio River Chile, IPN
REQUEST FOR INSPECTION at http://wvv.worldbank.org. The work of the IFC, however, is not
covered by the Inspection Panel procedures. See Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
25. This case concerned the financing of a power project in Tanzania by IDA. Tanzania:
Power Project,IPN REQUEST FOR INSPECTION RQ95/2 at http:llwww.worldbank.org.
26. This case concerned the financing of the Arun III Hydroelectric Project in Nepal by the
IDA. Nepal: Arun IIIHydroelectricProject,IPN REQUEST FOR INSPECTION RQ94/1 at http.//www.worldbank.org. In June 1995 the Panel suspended the second phase of the investigation when it was
satisfied that Nepal and the Bank's Management were doing all to abide by the applicable
regulations. Progress of the Arun III Hydroelectric Project Investigation, IPN REQUEST FOR
INSPECTION at http:///wvw.worldbank.org.
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Bank, contrary to the recommendation of the Panel.
The establishment of the Panel is a response to repeated criticisms
that the World Bank, in determining the conditions for loans or grants,
did not follow its own internal policies and that procedures for holding
the Bank accountable for the manner in which it exercises its competences should be developed. 8 It is part of a broader reorientation of the
World Bank.29 One might argue, in line with the dominant perspective
in international law, that it is for the member states and in particular the
state applying for a given loan or grant to ensure that applicable standards are implemented.
That line of reasoning in the case of the World Bank, and probably
other international organizations, gives rise to two questions. The first
question is the extent to which the World Bank sets the conditions for
individual loans independently of its member states. Both external and
internal reports illustrate that the Bank in practice operates rather independently of its member states when it comes to the setting of these
conditions.3"
The second question is whether member states are in a good
position to hold the World Bank accountable. The answer to this question
in turn depends on whether the member state is the state applying for a
loan or one of the non-applicant other member states. The member state
applying for a particular loan, on the one hand, is likely to be the only
member state with expertise on the project. On the other hand, this state
also has a direct interest in obtaining a positive decision from the Bank.
The applicant member state may even perceive its interests as being

27. This case concerned the financing of the Rodonia Natural Resources Management Project
in Brazil by the IBRD. Rodonia Natural Resources Management Project, IPN REQUEST FOR
INSPECTION RQ95/3 at http://www.worldbank.org. This decision was taken in Janaury 1996 subject

to the provision that the decision would be reviewed, with the assistance of the Panel, within a
period of 6-9 months. Id.
28. Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems:
A New Challengefor the World Bank and the IMF, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411 (1995); Jonathon Chan,
Challengingthe New ImperialAuthority: The World Bank and the DemocratizationofDevelopment,

6 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 159 (1993); Kevin Huyser, SustainableDevelopment: Rhetoric and Reform
at the World Bank, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255 (1994).
29. R.J.A. Goodland, The WorldBank's Environmental-AssessmentPolicy, 14 HASTINGS INT'L
& COM. L. REv. 811 (1991); David Hunter & Katherine Ray, MultilateralLending Activities, 4
Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 286, 286-289 (1993); Darryl Joannides, Restructuringthe World Bank: The
EnvironmentalLight Shines on the FundingofDevelopmentProjects,2 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV.

161 (1989); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 623 (1992); IBRAHrM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD

(1991).
30.

Bradlow, supra note 8, at 563-65.
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served by not conducting an environmental impact assessment or by not
developing a proper plan to resettle people displaced by a project. The
other non-applicant member states, unless they are directly affected (for
example in a transboundary context), on the one hand, are likely to have
a more neutral perspective on a given project. On the other hand,
considerations of reciprocity and lack of expertise may induce them not
to hold the Bank accountable.
Practice has shown that in pertinent cases none of the member states
of the World Bank were forthcoming when it came to holding the Bank
accountable for the decision taken in individual projects.3 ' Such member
state practices may have far reaching consequences. This is in part
because of the influence which a decision of the World Bank may wield
with third parties like other donors and private investors. These entities,
unless at least a prima facie case to the contrary is made, are likely to
assume that the support of the World Bank for a given project, means
that the World Bank has assured itself that the project meets its own

internal standards. These third parties thus, may be inclined not to
reassess aspects of the project which presumably the World Bank has

already considered.
It may be that individuals and groups, who directly experience the

repercussions of a given project, are in a better position than member
states to hold the Bank accountable for the manner in which it exercises
its competences3

This proposition places a heavy burden on those

31. David Hunter, MultilateralLending Activities/Development Assistance and Sustainable
Development, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 346, 346-48 (1992); Wirth, supra note 8; see also sources
cited supra note 28.
32. Similar considerations played a role in the establishment of the Second International Water
Tribunal (IWT) in 1992. The cases brought before the IWT illustrate that a state may not be the best
proponent of the legitimate interests of its residents when it comes to the construction of, for
example, dams. Such projects involve the interest in further industrial development, often voiced by
the state but also industry, the interests of large groups of people in sustaining their livelihood and
the general interest in the protection of the environment. In such cases all interests need to be
weighted, measures mitigating negative effects need to be developed and where rights are violated
these need to be compensated for. The state in whose territory the project is being undertaken, as
demonstrated by the cases brought before the IWT, is not always in a position to properly weigh all
the interests involved. A pertinent example is the Tucurui dam, as well as other dams, built in the
Brazilian Amazon region. The Tucurui dam especially serves the aluminium export industry, while
the local population has been deprive of its livelihood and suffers other negative effects of the project without compensation. In those cases where multilateral donors, as the World Bank, are involved
in such a project those organizations themselves have a responsibility to ensure the proper weighting
of interests and the individuals or groups affected by the project may be in the best position to
ensure that these organizations meet their responsibilities. For further information see IWT
FOUNDATION, DAMs 11-130 (1994); Ellen Hey & Andre Nollkaemper, The Second International
Water Tribunal, 22 ENvTL. POL'Y & L. 82, 82-87 (1992). See also the Declaration of Amsterdam,
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individuals and groups both from the point of view of the expertise
required and the finances required.33 Moreover, individuals and groups
will be in a position to bring to the Panel their requests for investigation
only if they have access to information about the applicable standards,
about the projects which the World Bank is considering, and about the
Inspection Panel procedure. 34 This would place a special responsibility
on the Bank to inform local populations in developing countries because
they are the most affected by decisions of the Bank. However, they are
also relatively far removed from the culture of the Bank in terms of, for
example, language and familiarity with the applicable regulatory system.
The Inspection Panel procedure is in line with the proposition that
individuals and groups may be in a relatively good position to hold the
World Bank accountable for the manner in which it exercises its public
policy competences. It is also a significant step towards the development
of an element of a new perspective in international law in the sense that
it recognizes the direct relevance in international law of the relationship
between an individual or a group and an international organization.
The Inspection Panel procedure itself, however, has traits which
reflect both the dominant perspective in international law and the new
perspective in international law. The traits that reflect the dominant
perspective in international law result in the Inspection Panel procedure
being weak when judged by the standard of government subject to the
rule of law. First, the Panel bases its conclusions on internal regulations
of the World Bank, as distinct from international law35 and the Inspection Panel procedure thus does not resolve the important debate about the
extent to which the World Bank is bound by civil and political rights and
other human rights law.36 Secondly, the conclusions of the Panel are
legally non-binding decisions that the Bank's Executive Directors may
choose to follow or not.37 Thirdly, the members of the Panel are

reprintedin id., at 120 (serving as the basis for the Tribunal's judgements).
33. If this is the case in the relatively homogenous European context, this is even more likely
to be the case in the heterogenous context of the World Bank. Cf. Sands, supra note 3.
34. On the Bank's disclosure of information policy see WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK
OPERATION MANUAL: BANK PROCEDURE BP17.50 (1993); Disclosureof OperationalInformation,

4 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 872 (1993). See also Hunter and Ray, supra note 29, at 286 (doubting
whether the Bank's new information policy, due to the large measure of discretion left to borrower
states, will indeed effectively increase the Bank's transparency).

35. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 12, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 1, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
36. See supra note 9.

37. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 19, 23 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 39, 55, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
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employees of the Bank and have an exclusive loyalty to the Bank.38
Fourthly, the Panel, on issues related to the Bank's rights and duties,
must rely on the advice of the Legal Department of the Bank39 instead
of independent legal advice. Fifthly, the procedure is non-adversarial in
character. This trait is illustrated by, among others, the fact that the
requester is not entitled to react to the responses of the Bank's Management to the request and the findings of the Panel.40 Sixthly, the Operating Procedures require the Bank's Management to submit recommendations in response to the Inspection Panel's findings after an investigation,4 1 while it provides that the Inspection Panel is to pronounce itself
on whether or not the Bank has complied with relevant policies and
procedures 2 This would seem to imply that the Bank's Management,
instead of the Panel, is itself to pronounce on ways of repairing the
wrong. Seventhly, the content of the Panel's recommendations and
reports, and the accompanying reaction of the Bank's Management, are
only made available to the requester, as well as the public, after the
Executive Directors have taken a decision.4 3 The Panel's only discretion
here is to make available to the requester any new material facts. It may
not make available opinions or judgements, provided by the Bank's staff,
the Executive Directors or the authorities in the country where the project
is located.4 Eightly, the role of the state in whose territory the Bankfinanced project takes place is not regulated either in the Resolution or
in the Operating Procedures which only provide that this state shall be
consulted.4 5 It is, for example, not determined that its submissions are
to be made public. Lastly, in situ inspections by the Panel are to take
place only prior to the explicit consent of the state in whose territory the

38. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 10, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995).
39. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), parm. 15, 34 I.L. N. 520 (1995);
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, par. 61 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
40. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 13-15, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995);
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 52-55, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
41. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 23, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995);
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 54, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
42. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), par. 22, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995);
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 52(b), 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).

Inspection Panel Operating
Inspection Panel Operating
Inspection Panel Operating
Inspection Panel Operating

43. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 25, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 40 and 56, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
44. Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 48, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
45. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 21, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 60, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
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project is located."
Those traits reflecting the dominant perspective of international law
in fact ensure that the entity - the Bank - whose actions are being
considered directly maintains a strong grip on the procedure itself and its
outcome. In addition, they attribute a largely "extra-procedural" position
to the member state in whose territory the Bank's-financed project takes47
place, and whose conduct may also be considered, albeit indirectly.
This point is underscored by the lack of regulation of the role of the state
in whose territory a project is located and the fact that no minimum
period of time is provided for within which the member state in whose
territory a project is located is to react to a request for in situ inspection.
Traits in the Inspection Panel procedure that reflect a new perspective in international law are as follows. First, the Inspection Panel
procedure establishes an administrative, or quasi-judicial, complaint
procedure for individuals and groups vis a vis an international organization. Secondly, the members of the Panel may meet directly with the
requester and with other affected people.48 Thirdly, the Panel is free to
employ its own investigatory methods including public hearings.49
Fourthly, during the investigatory stage, members of the public may
provide the Panel with information."
Those new perspective traits provide the basis for a procedure which
is unprecedented in international law. They make the procedure a
relatively strong one when judged by the standard of quasi-judicial means
hold international organizations accountable for the manner in which they
exercise their public policy competences. A conclusion that can be
supported by the fact that they enable the Inspection Panel to obtain
information from a variety of sources and at its own initiative or at the
initiative of others including members of the public and by the proviso

46. Res. No. 93-10 (1993), para. 21, 34 I.L.M. 520 (1995); Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 46, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).

47. The conduct may be considered indirectly because what is directly under consideration is
the alleged failure of the Bank to abide by the operational policies and procedures; however, this

includes the Bank's alledged failure to follow-up on the borrower's obligations under loan
agreements. See supra note 17.

48. Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 45(a), 34 LL.M. 510 (1995).
49. Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 45, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
50. Whether conditions are imposed on such participation in the investigation is unclear.

Paragraph 50 of the Operating Procedures refers to "any person." Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, para. 50, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995). Yet, the Introduction to the Operating

Procedures refers to "any person ... who provides the designated Inspector(s) with satisfactory
evidence that he/she has an interest, apart from any interest in common with the public ...
Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, Introduction, 34 I.L.M. 510 (1995).
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that the main documents resulting from the procedure are to be made
public at the end of each of its two stages.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT.

The establishment of the Inspection Panel procedure, on the one
hand, can be regarded as evidence of a failure of the state system. It may
also be regarded as the result of the failure of states to control the
competences exercised by international organizations (organizations
which these states themselves established). On the other hand, the
procedure may be regarded as a logical consequence of the globalization
of society in which the roles of individuals, groups, states, and international organizations, are no longer captured satisfactorily by the dominant
perspective in international law. A new coherent perspective in international law has not yet emerged to replace the present dominant
perspective. Importantly, however its possible elements are now being
seriously discussed, at least in academic writings. 5' One of the recurring
elements in the debate over this new perspective is the need to incorporate directly into the international legal system the increased role of individuals and groups in international affairs. 2 One way of doing that is
to recognize that the relationship between an individual or group and an
international organization is directly relevant in international law.
The Inspection Panel procedure recognizes that the relationship that
exists between individuals or groups and an international organization is
a relationship that may also be directly relevant in international law. To
date, the practice of the Panel has been insufficient to reach conclusions
about the extent to which the new perspective in international law, as
reflected in certain traits of the Inspection Panel procedure, will prevail

51. See, e.g., CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) (illustrating
the problems to which the traditional bilateral model which is still prevalent in international law,
gives rise in an international society where the many factual relationships among states and between
states and other actors are increasingly inter-linked and concerned with community or collective
interests); Richard A. Falk, The United Nationsand the Rule of Law, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 611 (1994) (illustrating that it is at least unclear which laws govern military operations
undertaken on the basis of resolutions of the Security Council and advocating more emphasis on the
development of rules of law binding on the United Nations).
52. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A People

Centered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1993). Benedict Kingsbury,
Claims by Non-State Groups in InternationalLaw, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (1993); David Scott
Rubin, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 9
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (1992); Dinah Shelton, The ParticipationofNongovernmental Organizations in InternationalJudicial Proceedings,88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994).

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 2:61

over those traits that reflect the dominant perspective. Whether the new
perspective will prevail, of course, depends on the work of the Panel
itself.
The extent to which the Panel will be able to conduct its work and
the authority ultimately accorded to its work, however, will be crucially
dependent on the roles which the following actors play: the member state
in whose territory the Bank's-financed project is located, the Bank's
Management, and the Bank's Executive Directors. Those three actors find
their positions embedded in those traits of the Inspection Panel procedure
that reflect the dominant perspective in international law. The manner in
which they make use of the prerogatives accorded to them will determine
the extent to which the procedure, which is weak when judged by the
standard of government subject to the rule of law, will be able to ensure
that individuals and groups indeed can hold the Bank accountable for the
exercise of its public policy competences. These three actors hold the key
to the extent to which the procedure will be able to fulfil the role in
international law which similar procedures fulfil in national societies
based on the principle of government subject to the rule of law. It is
these three actors, more than any others, which will determine the extent
to which the procedure, in practice, will contribute to the emergence of
a new perspective in international law.

